Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Brains in a vat, philosophy: thought experiment of Hilary Putnam (in Reason, truth and history, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1981) in which brains are floating in a nutrient solution while the reality is simulated through electrical impulses. It is about the question whether we can be sure not to be in such a situation. See also skepticism, reference, knowledge, causal theory of knowledge._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Robert Nozick on Brains in a Vat - Dictionary of Arguments
II 175 Brains in a vat/BIV/Nozick: although the belief that he is in the vat is correctly caused, the person is not susceptible to this fact. >Brains in vat/Putnam, >Reference/Putnam, >Meaning. Susceptibility would require covariance of belief and facts. >Counterfactual Conditional: if the brains were not in the vat, they would not believe it. II 210 Brains in a Vat/Nozick: we are not connected with the fact that we are not in the vat, even if we are not in the vat. Cf. >nonfactualism, >Facts. II 244 Brains in a vat/Skepticism/NozickVsSkepticism: Skepticism calls for something too strong: there is supposed to be a q ("We are in a vat"), such that it is incompatible with any p. >Skepticism. In contrast, the weaker is true: for each p there is something that is incompatible with it. - (Quantifiers interchanged). >Stronger/weaker._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |